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Yuval Millo argues that the patterns of decision-making in hedge fund management
are the key to understanding financial risk events. Lawmakers would benefit from
identifying and regulating these networks in order to create a more effective
assessment of market risks.
The elaborate connections between hedge funds contribute to the emergence of market
crises. In a recent paper, my colleagues and I collected data from 26 hedge funds and
eight brokerage firms in Europe, the United States and Asia between December 2007
and June 2009. The hedge funds analysed controlled 15 per cent of all assets managed by hedge
funds.
The data revealed that decision-making in these hedge funds relies crucially on a two-tiered structure
of connections – the first amongst hedge fund managers and the second between themselves and
brokers. This structure of connections contributes to a situation whereby, once hedge funds collectively
accepted an investment idea and invested accordingly, they “locked in” on the idea, ignoring warning
signs.
To understand how connections can contribute to the emergence of financial risk, we need to take into
account the motivations of the different actors. Hedge fund managers interact with brokers who execute
trades on their behalf and provide them with “flow information’. Flow information is descriptive
information about the conditions surrounding a possible investment action.
For example, whether there are more buyers than sellers for certain assets, the type of institutions that
are interested in buying or selling, and the magnitude of specific orders. The brokers’ flow information
is frequently combined with initial trading ideas. In contrast, hedge fund managers interact with other
hedge fund managers to compare and test their initial trading ideas, to look, jointly, for potential flaws
and to establish robust reasoning for choosing  particular trading positions.
These different motivations and practices can be defined as different “logics of connectivity”. Logic of
connectivity is the set of intentions guiding the actor’s communicative actions, which, if reciprocated by
the actor’s counterparties, are likely to lead to the establishment of connections. The findings show that
the  hedge fund managers’ dominant logic of connectivity encourages  creating connections with other
hedge fund managers, but hedge fund managers tend be selective, preferring connections within  small
and cohesive groups.
Brokers’ logic of connectivity, on the other hand, motivates them to create and maintain communicative
connections with as many hedge funds as possible, but not with other brokers. In other words, brokers
aim to position themselves at the centres of star-like network formations. The two logics of connectivity
identified and their resulting structure of connections are inherent to decision making amongst hedge
funds and have a crucial impact on their structure of opportunities and risks.
These findings inform financial regulation and lawmaking. For example, SEC regulations that follow the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 demand hedge funds to
disclose, among other things, details about their trading and investment positions and their valuation
policies and practices.
Such information can be used to construct networks, similar to the ones identified above and thus
produce a view of the popularity of different trading positions and the hedge funds who share these
positions. Future regulation could also incorporate the properties of the actors and networks when
assessing risks, requiring the regulator to be equipped with rules that allow it to uncover these
networks, supervise them and where necessary intervene in them.
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